Open-Secret Voting
Adrian Vermeule © 2010 Although the major costs and benefits of both open and secret voting are tolerably well understood in the abstract, it is difficult to know which mode is better in particular institutional environments. To take only one dimension of the problem, which type of voting minimizes corruption overall? After a scandal at the 2002 Olympics, the International Skating Union switched to a system of anonymous voting by figure-skating judges. The rationale for the switch was to reduce the advantage to skaters of having a compatriot judge on the panel -an advantage resulting from some mix of home-country bias (say, judges from the U.S. giving higher marks to U.S. skaters) and vote-trading on panels (say, U.S. and Canadian judges colluding to give higher marks to Canadian and U.S. skaters, respectively). After the switch to secrecy, however, the compatriot-judge advantage increased, probably because anonymous voting reduced public monitoring of corrupt judgments. But perhaps we need not choose between the two modes. In Political Tactics ("PT"), Bentham briefly argued that in some cases it is advantageous for an assembly to take an open vote and a secret-ballot vote in succession, on the same issue .
Because open voting can induce the voters to falsify their preferences or judgments, the secret ballot provides a kind of "appeal from the apparent to the real wish of the assembly" (PT 148) . In what follows I will ask whether this procedure of open-secret voting has anything to recommend it, and under what conditions.
1 Zitzewitz (2010) . 2 Andrews and Pear (2007) : A1.
Somewhat similar procedures have actually existed in historical assemblies. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Italian Parliament would take an open vote followed by a secret vote on bills designated as issues of confidence; 3 sometimes the two votes would show dramatic discrepancies, as I will discuss below. In Athens, under a procedure called probole, prosecutions for offenses at festivals would first go before the assembly for an open vote, and then before a jury for a secret-ballot vote. 4 Although the assembly and jury were not technically the same voting body, their memberships overlapped considerably. 5 In other cases, the sequence is reversed (secret-open voting Hine (1993): 190-92. 4 Demosthenes (1990): 13-17. 5 For a summary of the qualifications for assembly and jury attendance, and for the question how much the memberships of the two bodies overlapped, see Ober (1996) The adoption, however, of one of these methods, does not exclude the other.
There are cases in which it is advantageous to combine them, by making them follow upon the same question. The result of these two operations, whether they coincide or whether they differ, would always furnish very instructive indications.
(PT 147).
But why exactly is it beneficial to use an open-secret voting procedure?
Bentham's idea is that secret voting should be used in assemblies when, but only when, "circumstances render a hidden influence suspected" (PT 148 occur where open deliberation is followed by a secret ballot, at least in groups sufficiently small that all or most members can speak on the record one way or another.
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• A study of voting procedures in faculty decisionmaking recounts:
Students at one university sought to become members of the university's decision-making body. When they proposed this idea at a student-faculty assembly, the majority of faculty -in an open ballot conducted in front of the students -voted for preliminary approval of the proposal. Two weeks later, 11 Hine (1993): 192. 12 Ibid. 13 Schermers (1965) : 637. 14 Ashman and Alfini (1974): 157. however, when the faculty voted on the issue formally by secret ballot, they rejected the idea.
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• In federally-regulated workplaces, employers may agree to recognize a union based on a "card-check" -essentially an open vote. If a majority of employees signal their support for the union at the card-check stage, a formal vote on unionization is held by secret ballot. Where a formal vote occurs, in some 30% of the cases the union obtains a majority of employee cards yet fails to garner a majority of the secret ballots.
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Yet the striking difference between the first and second votes in these examples does not, by itself, tell us anything at all about which one is "false" and which is "true."
Competing not develop the thought, it supplies a rationale for his procedure that manages to do without the strong assumption that the secret ballot alone yields "true" preferences or judgments. Rather, a dual open-secret voting procedure can supply useful information both to the members of the voting group themselves, and also to outside parties. An important limitation of this epistemic rationale is that it pictures voting as a mechanism for aggregating judgments rather than preferences; the plausibility of this assumption varies with the institutional setting and the nature of the issues, as I will discuss below. 22 Although it would be too much of a digression to pursue the issue, I note Pliny the Younger's suggestion that the very act of switching between transparency regimes might temporarily accentuate the benefits of either regime while temporarily minimizing its costs (a kind of "Hawthorne effect"). In 103 or 104 C.E., Pliny wrote that under a previous regime of open voting, the Senate's proceedings have been marred by uncontrolled shouts of support [for candidates], and recourse has been had to secret voting as a remedy. Meanwhile it has already served as that remedy, because it was a novel and emergency measure, but I fear that as time goes on the remedy itself may give rise to vices, the danger being that silent voting may give rise to shamelessness; for how few evince the same concern for what is honourable in secret as in public? Many show respect for their reputation, but few for their conscience. But it is too early to worry about the future. In the meantime, thanks to these writing-tablets we shall have magistrates who have deserved election . . . . Pliny the Younger (2006): 80. Pliny's worries about the long-run effects of the secret ballot turned out to be justified. In 105 C.E., he observed that
[a]t the recent elections several tablets were found to have many witticisms and disgusting comments inscribed on them . . . . The Senate was furious, and with loud cries implored the anger of the emperor against the man who had inscribed them. But the culprit cheated them and escaped detection; perhaps he was even one of the protesters! Ibid., 103. The logic of the mechanism would then suggest the remedy of a switch back to open voting, and so on in an indefinite cycle -unless the voters' knowledge that the switches are temporary would itself prevent the Hawthorne effect from operating. will supply the benefits of responsibility due to public scrutiny, and then turn around and say that the secret vote will supply the benefits of freedom from external influence.
Of course each mode has the familiar vices of its familiar virtues. Open voting can induce posturing, 24 political correctness, 25 or, what is equally bad, bending over backwards to signal that the voter is not politically correct; 26 it also makes possible credible commitments to corrupt bargains with other voters or third parties. Secret voting can free voters to pursue self-interest and may actually increase corrupt bargains by diminishing public monitoring. But there is no need to take an ultimate stand on the net 23 For examples and a general analysis of second opinions, see Vermeule (2010) . 24 Stasavage (2007) . 25 Morris (2001) . 26 Fox (2007) .
comparative costs and benefits of the two types of voting. Rather, a procedure that uses both types of voting in combination may, in a given environment, be superior to a procedure that uses either type alone.
In designer must trade off the benefits of a dual-voting procedure against its clear direct costs and opportunity costs. The direct cost is simply that the body must vote twice, not once. The opportunity cost is that the voting body will be able to process less business overall, or will process the same amount of business less quickly. I believe, although I cannot prove, that these costs will typically be minor. In any event, taking these costs as
given, I will pass on to two more fundamental considerations. 31 Although in some cases, expert committees engage in decisionmaking by "apparent consensus." Urfalino (2007) . 32 See Vermeule (2009) .
If the vote is binding, then some tiebreaking procedure or default rule must be invoked. As discussed above, if a first open vote is trumped by a second secret vote, in the sense that a motion or proposed action will fail unless it survives both stages, then there is a kind of moral-hazard effect and the voters may take the open vote less seriously than they otherwise would, encouraging posturing and symbolic politics. At a minimum, which tiebreaking procedure or default rule is best will be a highly contextual and information-intensive question, heavily dependent upon the nature of the institution and the issue. From the standpoint of the institutional designer, setting up procedures to cope with indeterminacy when dual voting procedures are used for binding votes amounts to a cost, one that may exceed the benefits of institutionalizing a second-opinion mechanism.
Collating these two considerations implies that open-secret voting will generally be most useful for the advisory aggregation of judgments, where the voting procedure can supply useful information both to the voters themselves and to an administrative agency or other outside principal. Open-secret voting will, however, be inapposite for either represent an aggregation of maximally responsible judgments, the secret vote an aggregation of maximally autonomous ones, and that both will be informative, both for voters and other actors. This justification is most persuasive in cases where the voting body provides a collective judgment that is advisory rather than binding.
